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INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) began its fourteenth year of
jurisprudence.' Over the years, the Federal Circuit has received wide
acclaim for bringing more consistency and predictability to patent law
and for engendering a climate conducive to obtainment and
enforcement of patents. Indeed, many individuals believe that the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence has had the effect of markedly
enhancing the economic value of patents in general, as well as their
notoriety among the public.2 Yet, despite the Federal Circuit's
commendable achievements, it has not brought the measure of
predictability or clarity to certain areas of patent law desired by a
number of individuals. In some instances, the Federal Circuit has
deliberately eschewed bright-line rules on the theory that such rules
are unworkable or are simply repugnant to fundamental policies
underlying patent law.' In other instances, predictability appears to
be, at best, an incremental goal of the Federal Circuit.'
The law relating to the "on-sale" and "public-use" bars5 has long
been a chaotic area of patent jurisprudence. The case of Philco
Corp. v. Admiral Corp.,6 for example, characterized the state of the law
in 1961 as follows:
The cases dealing with § 102(b) of the Patent Act are in a state of
confusion resulting in part from an attempt to establish hard and
fast rules of law based upon overly refined legal distinctions. The
area sought to be governed by these rules, however, encompasses
an infinite variety of factual situations which, when viewed in terms
of the policies underlying § 102(b), present an infinite variety of
legal problems wholly unsuited to mechanically-applied, technical
rules.7
1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-164, §§ 101, 102, 96 Stat. 25
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44(a), 44(c) (1988)).
2. See, eg., Brian C. Cannon, Note, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for Biotecinology
Patents, 79 CORNELL L REV. 735, 744 (1994) (noting court's recognition of "immense value" of
patent monopoly); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of
Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REv. 351, 394 (1993) (postulating increased consistency in patent
decisions in Federal Circuit as compared to predecessor).
3. See infra Parts VI and VII (discussing underlying policies and totality of circumstances).
4.- See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text (explaining application of principles of
contract law to on-sale inquiry).
5. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining "on-sale" and "public-use" bars as
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
6. 199 F. Supp. 797 (D. Del. 1961).
7. Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961).
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Indeed, some five years after its formation, the Federal Circuit itself
remarked that the court's comments in Philco "are as apt today as
when made in 1961. "8 The question is whether the Federal Circuit
has since diminished confusion and, more importantly, whether it has
fashioned legal principles which yield at least fairly predictable results.
In a broad sense, the Federal Circuit has reduced confusion as to
the application of the on-sale and public-use bars by adopting a single
standard for making a prima facie case for, and ultimately proving,
the bars.9 It has thus resolved the conflict among the circuits as to
the proper burden of proof standard."0 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has also clarified the law and established some rather
practicable rules to govern some issues, such as what constitutes on-
sale activity." With respect to other issues, however, such as the
stage of development an invention must reach as a predicate to
triggering the bars, the Federal Circuit has fostered more confusion
and unpredictability.1
Overall, the Federal Circuit has shunned a bright-line rule oriented
approach to the bars by mandating the application of an inherently
indeterminate "totality of the circumstances" test in conjunction with
a policy-based analysis.' 3 Of course, as the court in Philco implied,
some uncertainty is to be expected due to the very nature of the on-
sale and public-use bars. 4 Whether this state of the law is desirable,
or is a necessary consequence of any on-sale or public-use bar inquiry,
is still open to considerable debate.
This Article focuses on the impact of more than ten years of
Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the on-sale and public-use bars,
including, in particular, the Federal Circuit's effect on pre-Federal
Circuit jurisprudence. Part I of this Article introduces the basic
statutory framework of the bars. Part II discusses the burden of proof
8. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part HA.
11. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Circuit's policy on
what constitutes on-sale activity).
12. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over when invention
is sufficiently developed to trigger on-sale bar).
13. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(explaining that facts of case must be considered in light of how they comport with policies
underlying on-sale and public-use bars, and enumerating several of these policies). Relevant
policies include (1) discouraging removal of inventions from the public demain that the public
reasonably believes are freely available; (2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of
inventions; and (3) allowing the inventor to determine the potential economic value of a patent.
Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
14. See Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961) (revealing
uncertainty in light of variety of factual situations that bars can involve).
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relating to the bars, while Parts III and IV delve into the specifics of
each of the bars. Part V relates to the policies underlying the bars
and Part VI discusses the totality of the circumstances test. Finally,
Part VII deals with the experimental-use negation.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The on-sale and public-use bars to patentability are codified in
35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides that a person shall be entitled to
a patent unless "the invention was... in public use or on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States." 5 The current language of § 102(b)
was originally enacted as part of the U.S. Patent Act of 1952.16
Earlier Patent Acts, dating back to the 1800s, 7 however, contained
language barring patents on inventions that were in public use or
on sale earlier than a specified grace period between the filing of a
patent application and the activity in question.'" Thus, the bars have
over 150 years of jurisprudence behind them. Nevertheless, certain
cases decided before the enactment of the 1952 Act are not easily
reconciled with § 102(b). A primary reason for the discrepancies is
that the Patent Act of 1839 invalidated patents on inventions which
were on-sale or in-public use within the specified grace period and
then later abandoned during that period. 9 In pre-1952 cases,
therefore, courts tended to intertwine the issue of abandonment or
forfeiture with any public-use or on-sale inquiry.
II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Law
The Patent Act of 19522" sets forth standards governing the
burden of proof of patent invalidity and the presumption of validi-
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
16. U.S. Patent Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988)).
17. SeeAct ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 4 Stat. 117; Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat.
353.
18. See2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILrIY, VAUDITY
AND INFRINGEMENT § 6.02[1], at 6-7 (1994) (discussing section 6 of Patent Act of 1836, which
allowed patents only on inventions not in public use or on sale at time of application, and § 7
of Patent Act of 1839, which set forth two-year grace period for determining whether invention
was on sale or public use).
19. See idL (stating that proof of inventor abandonment was grounds for holding patent
invalid).
20. Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 812 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)).
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ty.2' In particular, section 282 provides that a "patent shall be
presumed valid .... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidi-
ty.,22 Section 282, therefore, explicitly places the burden of proving
invalidity, based on the on-sale or public-use bars, on the party
invoking either of those bars.23  Even so, conflicts persisted among
the courts as to the quantum of proof required to establish the
existence of the bars and as to the circumstances, if any, under which
the burden of proof shifted to the patentee. A number of courts
necessitated clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate the bar.24
Other courts indicated that the nature and type of evidence presented
dictated the quantum of proof.' That is, the clear and convincing
evidence standard applied where evidence of an invalidating on sale
or public use was "inherently suspect," while a preponderance of the
evidence standard applied "in the usual patent case."26 A few courts
even adopted a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard under certain
circumstances.
27
Once the challenger made a prima facie showing of on-sale or
public-use activity occurring before the critical date,28 a number of
courts shifted the burden onto the patentee29 to prove that the
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22. I&
23. See id (stating that party asserting invalidity has burden of establishing invalidity on any
ground specified in part II of patent title, which includes § 102(b) as condition for patentabili-
ty).
24. See Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1054-55 (4th Cir. 1976)
(upholding jury's findings that clear and convincing evidence did not establish patent's
invalidity); Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294, 298 (10th Cir. 1974) (reversing lower court's
judgment n.o.v. and reinstating jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of patent
infringement).
25. SeeDickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that clear
and convincing evidence was necessary because facts and circumstances required it); Rains v.
Niaqud, 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that clear and convincing evidence was
unnecessary for defendant to be granted summary judgment as long as defendant is able to
prove evidence of prior use).
26. See Dickstein, 522 F.2d at 1296-97 (noting that higher standard would be appropriate
where oral testimony based on stale facts and circumstances was used to establish public use).
27. See Hobbs v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971)
(noting that Fifth Circuit had previously used varying statements to describe required quantum
of proof and holding that presumption of patent validity may be rebutted only if proof is
established by greater than mere preponderance of evidence regardless of whether this quantum
of proof is labeled as clear and convincing or beyond reasonable doubt); Grayhill, Inc. v. AMF
Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 772 (D.NJ. 1978) (explaining evidence of prior public use can
only be established by proof, so clear, convincing and cogent, so as to be beyond reasonable
doubt), affld, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979).
28. "Critical date" refers to the date specified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which is exactly one
year before the effective filing date of a U.S. patent application.
29. The term "patentee" includes not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued, but
also the successors in interest to the patentee. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1988).
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activity was an experimental use or was otherwise negated. 0 Indeed,
even precedent in the Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), seemed to subscribe to this
burden-shifting rule.8" A number of courts also indicated that the
issue of whether a patent was invalid in light of the on-sale or public-
use bars was one of fact." These precedents had their roots in the
well-acknowledged "morass of conflict 38 among the circuits as to the
quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption of patent
validity.
3 4
B. Federal Circuit Law
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly and unequivocally stated that
the party challenging the validity of a patent has the statutory burden
of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 5 According
30. See Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 681 F.2d 649,653 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that once prior
use has been established, patentee has burden ofjustifj'ng use by "full, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence (quotingSmith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249,264 (1887)));
Omark Indus. v. Carlton Co., 652 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that once prior public
use defense is adequately raised, burden shifts to inventor to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that established use was primarily experimental); Dart Indus. v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1973) (revealing that once prior use has been
established, inventor carries burden of avoiding statutory bar by proving that such prior use was
for purely experimental purposes).
31. See In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (remarking that in case where
invention was proven to be on sale prior to critical date, patentee must establish his
experimental use or sale by "full, unequivocal, and convincing" proof (quoting Smith & Gtiggs,
123 U.S. at 264)).
32. See Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 817 (D. Del. 1961) (noting that
words "on sale" imply crucial inquiry into intent of inventor and that determining whether or
not there is bar is question of fact); Lensch v. Metallizing Co., 39 F. Supp. 838, 842 (S.D. Cal.
1941) (stating that determining public use or offer for sale is question of fact).
33. See Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Escambia Chem. Corp., 430 F.2d 920, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1970)
(noting three differing standards of proof used by different circuits). The three standards are:
(1) preponderance of the evidence; (2) clear and convincing evidence; and (3) beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 (8th Cir. 1978) (explaining Eighth
Circuit's standard of proof in terms of substantial evidence while acknowledging other circuits'
use of clear and convincing evidence standard); Hobbs v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that courts "have not distinguished themselves for
consistency in their determination of the quantum ofproof necessary to rebut the presumption"
of patent validity); Woodstream Corp. v. Herter's, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143, 1149 n.4 (8th Cir. 1971)
(citing specific list of cases to show differing quantums of proof required to overcome
presumption of patent validity). In Hobbs, the Fifth Circuit identified an "apparent incon-
sistency" in the various statements of the necessary quantum of proof. Hobbs, 451 F.2d at 856.
In Woodstream, however, the Eighth Circuit cited Stamicarbon, a Fifth Circuit case, in support of
its characterization of the law as a "morass of conflict." Woodstream, 446 F.2d at 1149 n.4.
35. See, e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(stating that party asserting on-sale bar must prove bar by clear and convincing evidence);
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that patent
challenger has burden at trial to prove public use by clear and convincing evidence);
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist& Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,1459 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (explaining that challenger of patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 must introduce
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to the Federal Circuit, this ultimate burden of persuasion never shifts
to the patentee and the presumption of validity is never weakened or
destroyed.3 6 The challenger of a patent must, therefore, prove the
existence of an on-sale or public-use bar by clear and convincing
evidence.
3 7
Nevertheless, as is typical with any trial or summary judgment
motion, the burden of coming forward with evidence may shift back
and forth between the patentee and the challenger.'a Once the
challenger demonstrates a prima facie case of an on-sale or public-use
bar, the burden shifts to the patentee to come forward with sufficient
evidence to counter the challenger's prima facie showing. 9 If the
patentee does so, the burden of coming forward shifts back to the
challenger."
The patentee may present sufficient evidence by showing that the
alleged on-sale or public-use activity was in fact primarily experimen-
tal,4 or, that the subject activity was an offer for sale of merely a
concept.42 This evidence, however, must be sufficiently convinc-
clear and convincing evidence to win challenge).
36. Lindemann, 730 F.2d at 1459 (citing Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
37. Id.; see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(stating that parties asserting bars must prove them by clear and convincing evidence); Baker
Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that because
substantial property rights are at issue, bar on patentability must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence).
38. The burden of proof consists of two elements: the burden of coming forward with
evidence and the burden of persuasion. In the context of the on-sale and public-use bars, the
burden of coming forward requires a party to come forward with sufficient evidence to forestall
a directed verdict or other ruling that would be adverse to it on the bars. The burden of
persuasion means that the party must adduce sufficient evidence to prevail by clear and
convincing evidence on the bar at issue. See CHiSUM, supra note 18, § 6.02[86-160] n.12.
39. See United States Envtl. Prods. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining
patentee's failure to offer sufficient evidence to counter challenger's showing of on-sale bar
where no record of experimental use was offered); see also TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering all evidence put forth by both
parties to decide whether entire record leads to conclusion of public use). Both U.S.
Environmenta4 911 F.2d at 714, and TPLaboratories, 724 F.2d at 966, involved appeals from bench
trials. It should be noted, however, that the court in TP Laboratories did not mention the
decision of its predecessor court, the C.C.PA, in In re Theis which appears to hold to the
contrary. See In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 791-92 (C.C.PA 1979) (involving appeal from Patent
and Trademark Office Board of Appeals, where no challenge of patent application was brought,
yet court still found on-sale bar after plaintiff failed to meet burden of proof). The Federal
Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the Court of Claims, now known as the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in South Corp. v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
40. Cf U.S. Environmenta4 911 F.2d at 716 (holding patent invalid based on patentee's
failure to come forth with sufficient evidence to counter challenger's showing of on-sale bar).
41. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656-57 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that
.a sale made because the purchaser was participating in experimental testing creates no on sale
bar").
42. 1&
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ing.4' In the case of a summary judgment motion, sufficiently
convincing means the evidence must present a "sufficient disagree-
ment to require submission to ajury" or must otherwise be sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact." In this regard, absent
corroboration in the form of documentary or physical evidence, oral
testimony is strictly scrutinized and regarded with suspicion.45
The significance of the Federal Circuit's pronouncements on the
burden of proof cannot be understated. While the Federal Circuit's
relatively recent decision in Markman v. West View Instruments, Inc.4"
may well portend more bench trials, patent actions have been
frequently tried to juries over the past ten years. Juries usually take
very seriously the instructions relating to the burden of proof. Thus,
the use of a clear and convincing evidence standard is a potent
weapon in the arsenal of the patentee. Due to the presumption of
patent validity, the burden of proof often works in favor of the
patentee on summary judgment motions. This is especially true in
light of the famous trilogy of 1986 Supreme Court cases on summary
judgments, which dictate that the burden of proof must be incorpo-
rated into any summary judgment analysis.4" Thus, the clear and
43. U.S. Environmental, 911 F.2d at 716; TP Laboratories, 724 F.2d at 971.
44. See Paragon Podiatry Lab. v. KLM Lab., 984 F.2d 1182, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The
Court in Paragon stated.
The proper inquiry, therefore, is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to ajury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law." ... In other words, "[slummary judgment is
authorized when it is quite clear what the truth is,".. . and the law requires judgment
in favor of the movant based upon facts not in genuine dispute.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Keystone Retaining Wall Sys. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444,
1449 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that, because material fact may affect final outcome of case
that fact is necessarily relevant to proceedings); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, 982 F.2d 494,
498 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that patentee cannot sufficiently raise issue of material fact by
merely contradicting own prior statements).
45. Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
American Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 308, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). For a
helpful list of factors to be considered in evaluating oral testimony, see Nordberg, Inc. v.
Telsmith, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1252, 1284 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 611 F.
Supp. 1498, 1511 (D. Minn. 1985).
46. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). In Markman, the Federal Circuit held that the
issue of claim construction, including any subsidiary factual issues relating to the meaning of the
claims, is for a court to decide. Id. Because in many cases a trier of fact's determination of the
meaning of the claims may be dispositive of infringement, and to a somewhat lesser extent
validity, bench trials and summary judgments can be expected to increase.
47. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986) (citing nonmoving party's failure
to make sufficient showing on essential element of case, to which she had burden of proof, as
basis for grant of summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
(concluding determination ofappropriateness ofsummaryjudgment is influenced by substantive
evidentiary standards that apply to case); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574,587-88 (1986) (finding that granting ofsummary judgment must be based on facts
of case and in light of proof required by applicable law). The Supreme Court further clarified
its pronouncements in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Semices, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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convincing standard will typically thwart a challenger's summary
judgment motion, and, in some cases, may even facilitate the
patentee's obtaining summary judgment that its patent is not invalid.
The patentee is favored because the patent challenger must show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to patent invalidity.' If there is no issue of material
fact, the patentee should be entitled to summary judgment in its favor
on patent invalidity. Of course, once the patent challenger has come
forward with clear and convincing evidence of invalidity, the patentee
must then adduce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the presence of clear and convincing evidence of
invalidity.49 In this regard, an inventor's affidavit evincing nothing
more than his subjective belief that the invention was not on sale or
in public use before the critical date does not create a genuine
issue. °
On the other hand, when the patentee moves for summary
judgment, the patentee may discharge its burden by showing that
there is an absence of material evidence to support the patent
challenger's case (i.e., by showing that the challenger's evidence is
insufficient to enable it to sustain its burden of proof at trial).5
Once the patentee comes forward with this showing, the patent
challenger must submit sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the presence of clear and convincing evidence of
invalidity. 2 In practice, this requirement probably greatly facilitates
the granting of summary judgment in favor of the patentee where the
evidence against validity is somewhat tenuous from a preponderance
of the evidence standpoint. On the other hand, where the evidence
appears to solidly meet the preponderance standard, a court may well
48. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary standards to prove
patent bar).
49. See Paragon Podiatry Lab. v. KLM Lab., 984 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(rejecting plaintiff's corroborative evidence as insufficient to establish genuine issue of material
fact); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that
inconsistency in plaintiff's testimony did not raise genuine issue of material fact); Constant v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's grant
of summary judgment that patent was invalid under, inter alia, § 102(b)).
50. See Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 497-99 (explaining plaintiff's experimental use claim did not
create issue of fact when based on patentee's subjective intent and not objective evidence).
51. See, eg., In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (examining appellant's
assertions of insufficiency of challenger's evidence); Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192,
1197 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining shifting burden of proof in challenges to patents).
52. See Pensa Inc. v. LA Gear Cal. Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(revealing that defendant who opposes summaryjudgment "must submit evidence raising a bona
fide issue of material fact as to the presence of clear and convincing evidence of invalidity");
Fromson v. Citiplate, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 195,200 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (explainingpatent challenger's
burden of convincing court that reasonable people could find patent invalid).
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be reluctant to find that the evidence is insufficient to forestall
summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit has described clear and convincing evidence as
evidence "which proves in the mind of the trier of fact 'an abiding
conviction that the truth of factual contentions [is] highly proba-
ble.'"53 It has not yet, however, delved deeply into the meaning of
clear and convincing evidence in the context of patent validity.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has stated that this standard is not
met where "extensive inferences" would have to be drawn from the
evidence to find an on-sale bar.'
In contrast to patent litigation, the burden of proof standard in
proceedings on a patent application before the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is a preponderance of the evidence based
on the totality of the evidence.5 Therefore, if the PTO asserts an
on-sale or public-use bar as grounds for rejecting an application, it
must prove the bar by only a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Even
so, the same principles of shifting the burden of coming forward with
evidence still apply.5 7 The Federal Circuit has also rejected the
premise that any doubts as to patentability should be resolved in favor
of the applicant."
The ultimate issue of whether an invention was on sale or in public
use under § 102(b) is a question of law which the Federal Circuit
reviews de novo 9 The factual findings underlying the conclusions of
the finder of fact are, however, subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review.' These factual findings are based on the many
53. Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n., 946 F.2d 821, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).
54. Id. But see Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(affirming district court's finding of on-sale bar, even though it was ostensibly based on broad
inferences).
55. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that patentability is
determined on totality of record by preponderance of evidence with due consideration to
persuasiveness of argument). The presumption of validity, of course, applies only to issued
patents. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
56. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that "[p]reponderance
of the evidence is the standard that must be met by the PTO in making rejections"); In re
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671,674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting patent applications are not entitled to same
procedural advantages as issued patents).
57. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449 (explaining once patent application is rejected by
PTO, applicant must be given opportunity to challenge rejection with evidence and argument);
Schrag v. Strosser, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1027 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1991) (requiring that after
prima facie case of public use is met, burden of proof shifts to patent holder).
58. In reAndersen, 743 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
59. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(explaining review of on-sale bar, which includes review of factual findings at trial court level for
clear error); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544,549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
review of on-sale and public-use bars as question of law that court reviews de nvo).
60. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 549.
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factors that enter into the "totality of the circumstances" test, which
underlies any legal conclusion as to the presence of an on-sale or
public-use bar.6 Above all, one must always consider the "totality of
the circumstances" and how these circumstances comport with the
policies underlying the bars.62 This approach is necessary because
the policies underlying the bar, in effect, define it.63
III. THE ON-SALE BAR
An examination of jurisprudence on the on-sale bar necessitates
consideration of the following questions:
1. What activities constitute placing the invention "on sale"?
2. What is the "invention" for the purpose of triggering and
applying the on-sale bar?
3. Where and when must the placing of the invention on sale
occur in order to trigger the on-sale bar?
4. Under what circumstances is the on-sale bar negated by the
experimental use doctrine or by other evidence?'
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Law
1. On-sale activities
Pre-Federal Circuit cases virtually universally held that a single sale
or offer to sell the invention before the critical date gave rise to the
on-sale bar, absent sufficiently countervailing proof.' Indeed, a
widely held view was that on-sale activity broadly referred to attempts
by the inventor or his company to sell the claimed invention.66
61. SeeBiodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, 946 F.2d 850,852 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining
that whether invention was adequately tested to give rise to on-sale bar is initially question of fact
for jury resolution to be determined by totality of circumstances analysis); see also infra Part VI.
62. Manville Saks Corp., 917 F.2d at 549.
63. Id.
64. This Article will only cursorily touch on the third question, which is generally well-
settled. The experimental use negation is addressed separately (see infra notes 217-68 and
accompanying text) as are the totality of the circumstances and underlying patent policies that
affect the resolution of any on-sale or public-use bar inquiry (see infra notes 198-216 and
accompanying text).
65. See Manufacturing Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1362 (11th Cir.
1982) (noting that there is no requirement that sale be consummated for bar to apply); In re
Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 791-92 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (explaining that for § 102(b) to apply, it suffices
that claimed invention, reduced to practice, is merely offered to potential customers, where
evidence of such offer includes existence of sales contract); Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co.,
482 F.2d 426,431 (9th Cir. 1973) (revealing that even activity not resulting in sale can constitute
on-sale bar).
66. See Robbins, 482 F.2d at 431 (explaining that activity by inventor or his company in
attempting to sell patented idea can constitute on-sale bar, even where actual accomplished sale
has not occurred); Amphenol Corp. v. General Time Corp., 397 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1968)
("'On sale' does not mean an actual accomplished sale but activity by the inventor or his
company in attempting to sell the patented idea."); Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod.,
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There was also a consensus that the bar could be invoked based not
only on the sales activity of the inventor, or of someone under the
inventor's control, but also on the sales activity of an independent
third party.67  Moreover, even a secret pre-critical date sale of the
claimed invention by the inventor or by a third party could trigger the
bar.6
These cases also reflect a constant struggle among the courts over
whether to adopt hard and fast rules to define on-sale activity or to
espouse a case-by-case approach. 9 This struggle was particularly
evident in situations involving executory contracts or sales activity that
did not appear to amount to a formal offer to sell.7° Some courts
developed definitive rules based on the express or implied content of
the offer or sales contract.71  Other courts declined to formulate
rigid rules as to what constituted on-sale activity.72  Instead, these
courts focused on whether, based on the facts presented and certain
underlying patent policies, the activity amounted to proscribed
479 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (stating that on-sale bar may be triggered by activity of
inventor or his company in attempting to sell patented idea).
67. See, eg., General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 62 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (re-
establishing that placing of invention on sale by unrelated third party can invalidate patent);
CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 103 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining on-sale bar may
apply if invention was sold by someone other than patentee more than one year prior to filing
date); Hobbs v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 860 (5th Cir. 1971)
(stating "[it] has... long been settled that placing on sale may be by the inventor or another,
with or without the consent of the inventor").
68. See Hobbs, 451 F.2d at 860 (noting that while secrecy may be relevant to issue of public
use, it is not relevant to on-sale determination).
69. Compare Robbins, 482 F.2d at 431-33 (setting forth rule to determine whether sale or
offering for sale precludes patentability) with Red Cross Mfg. Corp. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d
1135, 1139-41 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining statutory proscription under § 102(b) is not
concerned with formal requisites, but rather on effects of activity, to be determined on case-by-
case basis) and Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961) (criticizing
use of hard and fast rule of law in cases dealing with § 102(b) because this area of law involves
infinite variety of factual situations and legal problems, which are unsuited to mechanically-
applied technical rules).
70. See Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 300 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding that
"executory contracts for sale should be treated like those for use"); Griswold v. Dixie Foundry
Co., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 79, 80 (E.D. Tenn. 1948) (labeling executory contract with inventor
"license" rather than "assignment, grant, or sale" of patents). An interrelated aspect of this
struggle involved the question of what constituted the "invention" for the purpose of triggering
and applying the on-sale bar. See infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text (discussing effect of
actual reduction to practice on triggering on-sale and public-use bars).
71. SeeRobbins, 482 F.2d at 432-33 (relating such express or implied content to experimental
use); Micro-Magnetic Indus. v. Advance Automatic Sales Co., 488 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1973)
(quoting rule in Robbinsfor appropriateness of summaryjudgment when claim of "experimental
sale" is made).
72. See Red Cross Mfg. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d 1135, 1140 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that
effect of challenged activity govern rather than formal requisites of activity); In reYarn Process
Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 287 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting rule set forth in Robbins as
.excessively rigid").
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pre-critical date commercial exploitation of the claimed invention.73
A number of courts also attributed substantial significance to the
inventor's intent in evaluating alleged on-sale activity,74 although, as
a practical matter, the probative value at trial would depend on the
inventor's credibility. Thus, there evolved the rule that an invention
was not on sale unless (1) the patentee had a present intent to sell
the claimed invention and (2) the patentee had communicated that
intent to a prospective purchaser for the purpose of eliciting a sale,
and not for some other reason. 5
2. The invention
Pre-Federal Circuit cases also grappled with the question of what
constituted the "invention" for the purposes of triggering and
applying the on-sale bar.7' This question frequently surfaced in the
context of executory sales contracts. 7 In such cases, a conceptual
difficulty normally arose because, while the contract was entered into
before the critical date, the claimed invention was actually reduced to
practice or delivered after the critical date.7' The resolution of this
73. See, eg., Red Cross, 525 F.2d at 1139-41 (noting that such exploitation would unfairly
extend duration of patent monopoly); In re Yarn, 498 F.2d at 287 (asserting that "an inventor
should be free to introduce evidence of a bona fide experimental intent even if that intent is
not indicated within the contract or sale or offering"); Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F.
Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961) (revealing that plaintiff's sale-related activities, for purpose of
retaining competitive advantage were unallowable extension of patent monopoly).
74. See Dataq, Inc. v. Tokheim Corp., 736 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that
whether invention is on sale is primarily matter of inventor's intent as inventor must have
present intent to sell, and must communicate intent to prospective purchaser to elicit sale);
Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 599 F.2d 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that in order for
invention to be on sale patentee needs intent to sell which must be communicated to purchaser
to elicit sale); ef. Robbins, 482 F.2d at 431 (holding that inventor's testimony regarding his
subjective intent has no probative force against overwhelming evidence to contrary and is
insufficient to defeat adverse summary judgtnent).
75. Dataq, 736 F.2d at 604 (adopting Court of Customs and Patent Appeals test that
inventor have intent to sell and communicate intent).
76. SeP eg., Red Cross, 525 F.2d at 1144 (determining nature of invention's demonstrations
necessary to determine if on-sale bar is triggered); Ex-CelI-O Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc.,
479 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (concluding that purpose of demonstration of
invention is indicative of applicability of on-sale bar).
77. See, ag., In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding executory contract
insufficient to prove knowledge of invention's performance); Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523
F.2d 288, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining significance of executory contracts for purposes of
evaluating "invention" status).
78. National Business Sys. v. AM Int'l, 743 F.2d 1227, 1237 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding
executory sales contract fulfilled by new invention without purchaser's knowledge that product
was new invention did not violate on-sale bar), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 110 (1985); Robbins, 482 F.2d
at 433 (holding that sale before critical date did not violate on-sale bar when made for
experimental purpose); Hobbs v. United States, 451 F.2d 849, 859-61 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding
mere existence of sales contract is insufficient to establish placing on sale); McCreery Eng'g
Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1912) (holding executory sales contract
based on "plans" not sufficient to establish that machine was on sale absent evidence that
invention had been reduced to practice at time of contracting).
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question depended on whether the term "invention" meant concep-
tion79 coupled with actual reduction to practice, or an intermediate
state between conception and actual reduction to practice,80 or even
some subsequent state of development."'
Courts considering this question widely held that actual reduction
to practice of the claimed invention was a prerequisite for triggering
both the on-sale and public-use bars.82 A number of courts relied on
79. Conception, which is the mental aspect of the inventive process, is the formation in the
inventor's mind of a "'definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention,
as it is thereafter to be applied in practice.'" Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting I ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 947 (1987); Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.PA. 1929) (stating that
conception of invention consists of complete performance of mental component of inventive
art).
80. Actual reduction to practice, which is the physical part of the inventive process, is the
stage in an invention's development "when the invention has been reduced to a sufficiently
tangible form to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose." General Elec. Co. v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 654 F.2d 55, 62 (C. Cl. 1981). It requires at least a
physical embodiment, which includes all limitations of the claimed invention, and that the
inventor subjectively appreciate and recognize the reduction to practice at the time it occurs.
UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that invention
cannot be reduced to practice without physical embodiment including all limitations of claim),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); Heard v. Burton, 333 F.2d 239,243-44 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (stating
that recognition and appreciation of invention is necessary to claim product as invention).
Moreover, where testing is necessary, actual reduction to practice also requires that the claimed
invention be "sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose."
Barmag Banner Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 838 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (finding that invention cannot be offered for sale until it completes testing to verify that
it is operable and commercially marketable). There is, however, no requirement that the
invention, when tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development. Id.; see also King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reasoning that some
devices are "'so simple and their purpose and efficacy so obvious that their complete
construction is sufficient to demonstrate workability'" (quoting Eastern Rotorcraft Corp. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967))), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). Another
way to reduce an invention to practice is by filing a patent application describing the invention,
in compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which will result in a "constructive"
reduction to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
81. See Barmag, 731 F.2d at 836 (rejecting "on hand" doctrine which required device
incorporating invention to have existed in its ordinary and useable form and to have been on
hand and ready for delivery).
82. See, eg., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269,273-74 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating
reduction to practice is most widely used standard for determining when invention is
completed); Austin v. Marco Dental Prods., 560 F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (examining
legislative history of on-sale provision which revealed Congress' awareness that invention must
be reduced to practice before it was considered complete and before inventor required to file
for patent), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1978); Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302
(2d Cir. 1975) (indicating that one requirement for on-sale bar was that invention must have
been sufficiently tested to verify that it was operable and commercially marketable, i.e., that
invention could not be offered for sale until it was reduced to practice); Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig
Corp., 611 F. Supp. 1498, 1508 (D. Minn. 1985) (requiring party asserting patent bar to prove
claimed invention was previously known or embodied in single prior act, device or practice, i.e.,
conceived and reduced to practice (citing Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873),
aftd, 78 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir.)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 931 (1986).
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the following language"3 from the 19th century case of Coffin v.
Ogden:84
If the thing were embryotic or inchoate; if it rested in specula-
tion or experiment; if the process pursued for its development had
filed to reach the point of consummation, it cannot avail to defeat
a patent founded upon a discovery or invention which was
completed, while in the other case there was only progress, however
near that progress may have approximated to the end in view. The
law requires not conjecture, but certainty. 5
Nevertheless, some courts imposed the less exacting requirement
that the invention be "essentially completed."" In contrast, many
courts established an additional requirement, known as the "on-hand"
doctrine, 7 that the invention be in inventory or available for delivery
before the critical date."a The "on-hand" doctrine was especially
applied in cases of executory sales contracts.8 9 Even these courts,
however, typically carved out an exception to the "on-hand" doctrine
where the activity involved a display of operable samples before the
critical date, even though no production models were available for
delivery until after the critical date.9"
Eventually, criticism of the "on-hand" doctrine increased,91 and
Timely Products Corp. v. Arron"2 ushered in its demise in mostjurisdic-
83. See, e.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Escambia Chem. Corp., 430 F.2d 920,927 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 944 (1970); Medironi4 611 F. Supp. at 1508; Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-
Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp. 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
84. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120 (1873).
85. I& at 124.
86. See Red Cross Mfg. Corp. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d 1135, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975)
(holding on-sale bar triggered as long as invention essentially completed at time of allegedly
invalidating sale).
87. The "on hand" test requires that a "device incorporating the invention must have
existed in its ordinary or contemplated usable form, and must have been on hand and ready for
delivery more than one year prior to the patent application filing date." Gallard-Henning Mfg.
Co. v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 68, 80 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
88. Compare Red Cross, 525 F.2d at 1140 n.7 (stating that "complete lack of inventory and
tooling prior to critical date" does not preclude, as matter of law, finding of on-sale) with
McCreery Eng'g Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1912) (holding that
under on-sale defense, defendant is required to show machine existed as complete article of
sale-not on paper-but in fact).
89. See, eg., Red Cross, 525 F.2d at 1140 n.7; Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288,299-
301 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. SeeAmphenol Corp. v. General Time Corp., 397 F.2d 431,436 (7th Cir. 1968) (stating
that submission of samples renders device on sale, and that further testing after production and
delivery does not affect on sale status).
91. See Dart Indus. Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir.
1978) (stating patented product need not be on hand in commercial quantities for it to be on
sale), cert. denie 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
92. 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tions. In Timely Products, the Second Circuit held that the on-sale
bar applied where a solicitation of an order, before the critical date
for a specific article to be produced later, met the following prerequi-
sites:
(1) [T]he complete invention claimed must have been embodied
in or obvious in view of the thing offered for sale; (2) the invention
must have been tested sufficiently to verify that it is operable and
commercially marketable. This is simply another way of expressing
the principle that an invention cannot be offered for sale until it is
completed, which requires not merely its conception, but its
reduction to practice; and (3) the sale must be primarily for profit
rather than for experimental purposes. 94
In sum, notwithstanding many nuances, the prevailing view in 1982
of pre-Federal Circuit cases was as follows: A sale or offer for sale of
the claimed invention before the critical date could invalidate a
patent or prevent its issuance if, before the critical date, the claimed
invention was (1) reduced to practice, (2) embodied in, or was
obvious in view of, the product offered for sale, and (3) the sale was
primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes.9"
B Federal Circuit Law
1. On-sale activities
The Federal Circuit has followed much of the pre-Federal Circuit
precedent regarding the activities that constitute placing an invention
on sale. Therefore, a single sale or offer to sell the claimed invention
is enough to invoke the bar.96 Moreover, the bar applies to sales
activities by an inventor, someone under his control, or a third
party.97 It is not relevant that a pre-critical date sale or offer to sell
93. See e.g., UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647,653 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (declining
to adopt Timely Products test); Western Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (refusing to adopt rigid Timely Products test in favor of totality of circumstances).
94. Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1975).
95. CHISUM, supra note 18, § 6.02[6], at 6-69 to -71 (discussing Federal Circuit holdings
indicating that inventions need not necessarily be reduced to practice in order for "on-sale" bar
to apply).
96. See, e.g., A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that, regardless of acceptance, single offer to sell is sufficient to invoke on-sale bar); In re
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that single offer to sell is enough to bar
patentability is "well established" principle); General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 60
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (stating that completion of sale not required to invoke patentability bar, whereas
.mere offer" is enough).
97. JA LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir) (asserting
bar is not limited to sales by inventor or someone under inventor's control, but may result from
activities of third party), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986); see also In reEpstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (instructing that § 102 bars not limited to sales or uses by inventor or one
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was secret, except in the instance of a third party's sale of a product
made by a secret process." In other words, while a patentee's
pre-critical date sale of a product secretly made by a subsequently
patented process does invoke the on-sale bar, a third party's sale of a
product made by the subject process does not.'
In defining on-sale activity, the Federal Circuit has followed
pre-Federal Circuit precedent that opted for a policy-based factual
approach rather than hard and fast rules, thereby harmonizing the
overall approach to an on-sale inquiry.1 ° The Federal Circuit has
also fashioned the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case
for asserting the on-sale bar. The elements are as follows: (1) a
definite sale or offer to sell prior to the critical date, and (2) the
subject matter of the sale or offer to sell must either fully anticipate
the claimed invention or render it obvious by its addition to prior
art. '1 In this regard, the dissenting opinion in the case of Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., °2 maintained that the Federal Cir-
cuit actually has three tests: the basic test outlined above, a second
test analogous to the Timely Products test, °3 and a third test that
under inventor's control, but may result from third party activities).
98. In reCaveney, 761 F.2d 671,675 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating exception to general rule that
offer to sell is bar to patent issuance occurs where patented method is practical and kept secret
by third party and remains secret after sale of unpatented product of method).
99. Id.; see also D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (holding that where method is kept secret and remains secret after sale of product of
method, that sale will not bar another inventor from receiving patent on that method unless sale
was made by applicant for patent or assignee), celt. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985); Metallizing
Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946) (reasoning that
third party's use of secret process and subsequent sale of product made by secret process did
not bar inventor from receiving patent because there was no question of abandonment or
forfeiture by inventor), cert. deni 328 U.S. 840 (1946).
100. Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (asserting that court
has deliberately resisted rigid formulae and per se exceptions in applying on-sale bar and instead
considers totality of circumstances in each case); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford
Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "clear weight of authority is that bare offer
to sell does not ipso facto satisfy 'on sale' bar, and that the surrounding circumstances must be
considered").
101. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (indicating that
challenger has burden of proving that there was definite, pre-critical date sale or offer to sell
and that subject matter of sale or offer to sell fully anticipated claimed invention or rendered
it obvious by its addition to prior art), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); see also RCA Corp. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (determining that, in establishing prima
fade case, patent challenger has burden of proving definite sale or offer to sell more than one
year before application for subject patent and that subject matter of sale or offer to sell fully
anticipated claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to prior art);
Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1462 (finding that defendant had burden of proving that there was sale or
offer to sell more than one year before application for patent).
102. 5 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing elements of Timely Pods. test).
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requires balancing the totality of circumstances and policy consider-
ations. t '°
The Federal Circuit's reference to obviousness in the basic test 5
does not signify that the obviousness standard of 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
incorporated into the on-sale bar."0 6 Instead, if a device placed on
sale before the critical date anticipates the later patented invention
(i.e., the device meets all of the claim limitations), then the bar
applies, absent sufficient countervailing evidence.' 7 Otherwise,
such a device becomes prior art which can be used against the
claimed invention to show that the invention was obvious 8 (i.e., a
§§ 102(b)/103 bar)."°
The Federal Circuit's requirement of a definite sale or offer to sell
establishes a minimum threshold for the kind of commercial activity
which, absent sufficient countervailing evidence, will trigger the on-
sale bar or which becomes technical prior art for the purpose of the
§§ 102(b) and 103 analysis."0 Therefore, merely making prepara-
tions for the sale of a claimed invention is not enough to invoke the
on-sale bar."' Taken at face value, this requirement appears to be
more exacting than that implied in some pre-Federal Circuit prece-
104. Atlantic Thermoplastics II Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1482-86 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (setting forth each of three "tests" for determining existence of on-sale
bar and analyzing facts of case under all three).
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (stating need to prove definite sale or offer
to sell).
106. Section 103 provides that a patent may not be obtained "if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
107. SeeLabounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,1071 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (stating that patent may be barred either if device placed on sale is anticipation of
later claimed invention or, if claimed invention would have been obvious from on-sale device
in conjunction with prior art); UMO Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (indicating that challenger has burden of proving definite sale or offer for sale and if
these facts are established, patent owner must come forward with explanation of circumstances
surrounding what would otherwise appear to be commercialization outside grace period).
108. UMCEaectronics, 816 F.2d at 655-56 (recognizingprinciple that, where claimed invention
is not subject of sale, statutory bar will apply if invention is obvious in view of thing offered for
sale).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (delineating "on-sale" bar to patent issuance); id. § 103
(stating that patent may not be obtained if subject matter would have been obvious at time
invention was made to person having ordinary skill in art to which subject matter pertains).
110. SeeIntel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,830 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that proof that offers or sales were "likely" was insufficient to carry burden of proof that
sale or offer was made); RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(finding that, where there is no sale, definite offer to sell is essential requirement of on-sale bar
and excludes merely indefinite or nebulous discussion about possible sale). The Federal Circuit,
however, has used the word "firm" instead of "definite" in describing the requisite type of offer.
Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
111. Inte4, 946 F.2d at 830 (stating lack of circumstantial or direct evidence showing offers
or sales before critical date precluded on-sale assertion based on "preparations" for sale).
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dent which speaks of on-sale activity in the broadly defined sense of
"commercialization."'12 The Federal Circuit's present requirement,
however, can be reconciled with most of the earlier precedent by
examining the Federal Circuit's definition of "definite sale" and
"definite offer to sell" and how the Federal Circuit focuses the
subsequent evidentiary inquiry.
According to the Federal Circuit, contract law does not provide an
absolute litmus test for determining whether a definite sale or offer
to sell has been made."3  Therefore, unrestricted distribution of a
prototype for the purpose of soliciting a sale may raise the bar.114
Nevertheless, a pre-critical date definite offer, under contract
principles, clearly meets the threshold requirement and, as a practical
matter, contract principles are an important analytical tool."5 On
the other hand, "merely indefinite or nebulous discussion about a
possible sale" is not enough.
' 6
Because a formal contract or offer in contract terms is not a
prerequisite to application of the on-sale bar, the content of the
.document, in which the alleged sale or offer to sell is embodied, is
not itself ordinarily dispositive." 7 Rather, where the content of the
112. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (delineating pre-Federal Circuit
requirements for on-sale bar).
113. See RCA Corp., 887 F.2d at 1062-63 (stating that definite offer to sell requirement in
patent context may be met by patentee's commercial activity which does not rise to level of
formal "offer" under contract principles, however, definite offer in contract sense clearly meets
this requirement). This is, of course, consistent with the Federal Circuit's "totality of the
circumstances" approach. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613,
622 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating that current authority demands that bare offer to sell does not,
ipso facto, satisfy on-sale bar, and that surrounding circumstances must be considered).
114. See Intel, 946 F.2d at 830 (citing Stearns v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 737 F.2d 1565,
1569 (Fed Cir. 1984)). In Stearns, an order was placed for a syringe before the critical date.
After the critical date, the patentee shipped a prototype of a later patented syringe in response
to the order. Id at 1566-67; see also Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding no definite offer to sell where defendant engaged in negotiations
regarding necessity of further development and prototype testing because such negotiations were
for experimental purposes and not primarily for profit).
115. See, eg., RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062 (analyzing commercial activities under contract
principles of offer and acceptance for purposes of determining definite offer applicable to on-
sale bar); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463-64 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reasoning that
to determine whether there has been definite sale or offer, terms must be analyzed under
contract principles); General Elec. Co. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 654 F.2d 55,
59 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (employing general contract principles to determine whether product was
on-sale); seealsoAmway Corp. v. Nartron Corp., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1757, 1761-62 (W.D. Mich.
1994) (applying Michigan contract law to assess whether price quotation was budgetary estimate
or offer to sell).
116. RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062.
117. Ii. In RCA, the offer was embodied in a lengthy written proposal providing background
information, a detailed delivery schedule, a rate of completion of the proposed work and a
separate section on financial data and costs. Id The court found this offer was a definite offer.
I&; sw also Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (looking to
various forms of evidence to determine whether invention of patent was on-sale), aflg 17
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offer or sale is ambiguous, the Federal Circuit looks to any relevant
evidence which would establish the offer's content. Such evidence
includes memoranda, drawings, correspondence and testimony of
witnesses.118 For example, in Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.,"9 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's reliance on extrinsic
evidence to determine whether a simple pre-critical date price
quotation constituted an offer to sell the claimed invention. 20
Contrary to some pre-Federal Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit
emphasizes objective evidence and, additionally, has 'diminished the
significance of the prospective purchaser's knowledge of the inven-
tion. 2 This stems from the fact that the "policies underlying the
on sale bar... concentrate on the attempt by the inventor to exploit
his invention, not whether the potential purchaser was cognizant of
the invention."" Consequently, there is no requirement that a
purchaser have actual knowledge of the claimed invention to invoke
the bar.l" However, what the purchaser reasonably believes the
inventor to be offering is relevant to whether the offer for sale
objectively may be said to be of the patented invention. 24 Also
relevant is objective evidence of the purpose for which the alleged
offer, such as a price quotation, was made.'2
Furthermore, the inventor's attempted exploitation "must be
objectively manifested as a definite sale or offer to sell the inven-
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1247 (E.D. Va. 1990).
118. Sw RCA, 887 F.2d at 1060 (stating that relevant evidence may establish whether offered-
product is claimed invention).
119. 936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
120. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1991), affg, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1247 (E.D. Va. 1990).
121. See, e.g., Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that
relevant question is not whether public knew of invention, but rather whether product sold or
offered embodies invention claimed); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834,
836-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that to determine whether profit motivated transaction, court
must examine claimed features, offeror's objective intent, and totality of circumstances);
Envirotech Corp. v.Westech Eng'g, 904 F.2d 1571,1574-76 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (findingprospective
purchaser's knowledge of how invention will perform is manifest, but not dispositive and is not
same as offering or intending to offer it for sale); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reasoning that policies underlying on-sale bar focus on
inventor's attempt to exploit his invention, not whether potential purchaser was knowledgeable
of invention), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
122. King, 767 F.2d at 860.
123. hI; see also FeragAG, 45 F.3d at 1568 (holding no actual knowledge requirement placed
on purchaser).
124. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1576.
125. Amway Corp. v. Nartron Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(unpublished opinion) (vacating summary judgment on ground that purpose for which price
quotation was offered was material fact having direct bearing on whether invoking bar would
further bar's underlying policies); see. also Amway Corp., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760-62 (W.D.
Mich. 1994).
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don."2 6 Thus, the "subjective, uncommunicated and ultimate
intention of the offeror, however clear, is not alone sufficient."127
Nevertheless, objective evidence of an inventor's intent is pertinent
because the thrust of the on-sale bar inquiry is whether the inventor
thought he had a product which could be and was offered to
customers.128 With respect to executory contracts in particular, the
Federal Circuit's emphasis on an objectively manifested definite sale or
offer to sell tends to facilitate accurate assessment of what activity
qualifies as placing the invention on sale. In this regard, the cases of
Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc.129 and Ferag AG v. Quipp,
Inc.,"3 are illustrative. In the former case, the purchaser's knowl-
edge weighed against the bar because the purchaser understood the
patentee's proposal to be for a prior art design. In the later case,
purchaser knowledge was irrelevant because the purchaser did not
have any understanding as to whether a prior art device or a later
patented device was being proposed.
Consistent with prior precedent, the Federal Circuit has also stated
that the statutory time period in § 102(b)"' does not begin to run
until the invention becomes available to the public.1 2 "Public" can
mean a single prospective purchaser,3 depending on the totality
of the circumstances. Thus, in Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto
Co., s the patentee and a prospective purchaser entered into a
confidential development agreement under which the patentee would
initially make, and the purchaser would test, a certain product
126. Envirotedi, 904 F.2d at 1575.
127. Id.; see also Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1568 ("[T]he measure of the bar is what was offered,
not the patentee's intent.").
128. Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1187 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Mailer of Mahurkar Double Lumen
Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1369-70 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.) (involving exclusive
production licensee's sham sale of prototype of invention for purpose of avoiding provision in
license agreement that exclusivity would terminate absent sale by specified date).
129. 904 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
130. 45 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
132. Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that on-sale bar is measured by "the time the public came into possession of the
invention"); UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 660-61 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring
invention to be placed into hands of public in condition for immediate use requiring no further
speculation or experiment), cer. dened 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980,987-88
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that statutory period starts running when invention becomes available
to public), cert. denie! 383 U.S. 966 (1966).
133. Continental Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1270 (ruling prospective purchaser was private
corporation); Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding
individual general contractor was "public" entity); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853,860 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holdingsingle purchaser was "public" for purposes of on-sale
bar), cert. denie 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
134. 948 F.2d at 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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developed by the patentee. 3 Moreover, if the product were found
to be satisfactory, the patentee would then make it and sell it to the
purchaser at certain quantities and prices specified in the agree-
ment.13 6  The project was subsequently terminated, however, be-
cause the "mechanical performance" requirements were not met.
3 7
The Federal Circuit held that, under the totality of the circumstances,
the on-sale bar had not been triggered.'m
2. The invention
Early in its history, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the
"on-hand" doctrine and declined to adopt the Timely Products test.39
Thereafter, in UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,4' the Federal
Circuit was squarely presented with the issue of whether an actual
reduction to practice is a prerequisite for application of the on-sale
bar. '4 The court held that it was not an absolute requirement,
because the on-sale bar must be analyzed by evaluating the totality of
the factual circumstances in light of the policies underlying the
statute. 42 The court, however, left intact the first and third ele-
ments of the Timely Products test, 43 which still have vitality, although
they are subordinate to the policies underlying the bar and have been
further refined by the Federal Circuit.' 44 UMC Electronics, however,
did not resolve two very fundamental issues: (1) the significance of
reduction to practice in determining whether the claimed invention
was on sale before the critical date; and (2) the particular stage, if
135. Continental Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1269.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1270 (holding that product "was part of terminated development project that
never bore commercial fruit and was cloaked in confidentiality" and therefore was not on sale).
139. SeeBarmagBarmerMaschinenfabrikAG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,836-37
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting plaintiff's position that inventory of products should be made
requirement of on-sale bar). The court stated.
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation where, because commercial benefits outside
the allowed time has been great, the technical requisite of Timely Products for a physical
embodiment, particularly for a simple product, would defeat the statutory policy and
we, therefore, do not adopt the Timely Products test as the answer in all cases.
Id. at 837.
140. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
141. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 657 (holding that no single finding or conclusion is sine qua non to resolution of
on-sale bar).
143. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (listing elements of Timely Prods. test).
144. See RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that
prima facie case for on-sale bar requires definite sale or offer to sell, and that subject matter of
sale or offer to sell anticipate claimed invention or render claimed invention obvious by its
addition to prior art); UMCElearonis, 816 F.2d at 657 (stating formulation of requirements of
Timely Prods. not necessary to determine whether product was on sale).
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any, of development the claimed invention must have attained as a
predicate to triggering an on-sale bar."4 Both questions are mani-
festly pertinent because UMC Electronics stresses that the state of
development of the invention must be considered, along with all of
the other factual circumstances, and weighed against the policies
underlying the on-sale bar."4
In resolving the first question, the Federal Circuit in UMCElectronics
acknowledged that reduction to practice is still an "important
analytical tool in an on-sale analysis"147 and that its existence can
lighten the burden of proving the on-sale bar."4 Subsequent
Federal Circuit and district court opinions also reflect that in practice
the traditional "sufficiently tested" element of the legal definition of
reduction to practice is significant.14 Other district courts have
stated that reduction to practice is still an important, but not disposi-
tive, consideration.'
When considering the second question in UMC Electronics, the
Federal Circuit cautioned that an on-sale bar cannot arise from a sale
or offer to sell made at the time "the inventor had merely a con-
ception or was working towards development of that conception." 51
According to UMC Electronics, the reason is that at such time there is
not yet an existing "invention."'52 The court's opinion is, however,
ambiguous as to whether the term "merely a conception" means the
145. These same two questions are equally relevant to the public-use bar to the extent that
the UMC Electronics holding applies to the public-use bar.
146. See UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 656-57; see alsoA.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d
1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
147. UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 656.
148. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55 (Ct. CI. 1981) (en banc)).
149. See Buehler AG v. Ocrim S.P.A., 836 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (relying on
fact that invention described was "sufficiently tested" to ascertain workability); Biodex Corp. v.
Loredan Biomedical, 946 F.2d 850, 852-53 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that product must be
"sufficiently tested" for on-sale bar to apply); Sonoscan Inc. v. Sonotek Inc., 936 F.2d 1261,
1263-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding trial court's determination that patented invention was
"sufficiently developed" so that patent owner's quotation was genuine offer for sale); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 65, 69-71 (D. Del. 1993) (noting that
disk brakes were merely concept and testing was required before existence was established);
Southwest Aerospace Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 702 F. Supp. 870,884,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949,
1960 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that product had not been sufficiently tested to condude
product works). Testing, of course, may not always be an element of reduction to practice.
Branham Indus., Inc. v. Hydrafab, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1533 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (declaring
that selling product and believing product will work is sufficient proof).
150. See Sonoscan Inc. v. Sonotek Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1247, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1990),
af'd, 936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Reduction to practice is an important but not dispositive
issue in determining if the invention was offered for sale.").
151. UMCElectronics, 816 F.2d at 657; see also A.B. Chance Co., 854 F.2d at 1311 (noting that
mere concept of invention is not enough to trigger on-sale bar).
152. See UMC Electronics 816 F.2d at 657 (requiting more than mere concept for invention
to exist).
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legal definition of conception. Arguably, the primacy accorded to the
underlying statutory bar policies in any on-sale bar analysis dictates
that under certain circumstances a sale, or offer for sale, of a true
"conception" of the claimed invention should trigger the bar. The
situation where the on-sale activity relates to a rather simple invention
may present an especially compelling case.'
District court opinions decided after UMC Electronics evince
confusion as well as divergent views as to what stage of development
an invention must reach before the bar can be triggered. One court
has evaded the issue simply by referring to the lack of a "sufficiently
developed" invention." Another court has construed UMC Electron-
ics to require that, at the time of the offer, the invention either "must
have been shown to work for its intended purpose or the inventor
knew or was satisfied that the invdntion would serve its intended
purpose." 55 Still other courts appear to predicate the application
of the bar on whether the invention was tested sufficiently to demon-
strate that it was operable or worked for its intended purpose 6
One court has stated that UMC Electronics established a sliding scale
approach, meaning the less a sale or offer to sell looks like ordinary
commerce in search of a profit, the more complete the invention
must be to trigger the bar.'57 One district court also placed empha-
sis on whether the invention was "commercially marketable" or existed
in a commercial embodiment prior to the critical date.'58 Such an
approach is inconsistent with UMC Electronics and with the Federal
153. SeePfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1366, 1375 (N.D. Ind. 1988). In Pfaff,
the invention was fairly complex and was described only in drawings before the critical date.
lML While the court apparently did not appreciate the legal definition of conception, it did
determine that the drawings amounted to only a concept of the invention. 1eL
154. See Loral Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. C-3-86-216, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16865, at
*91 (S.D. OhioJan. 27, 1989) (stating court should consider stage of development of invention
to determine whether offer or sale occurred), rev'don other grounds, 899 F.2d 1288, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion).
155. Ziggity Sys. v. Val Watering Sys., 769 F. Supp. 752, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
156. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1625 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(stating product must be tested sufficiently to show that it will work); Southwest Aerospace Corp.
v. Teledyne Indus., 702 F. Supp. 870, 884, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949, 1960 (N.D. Ala. 1988)
(finding that product had not been tested enough to conclude that product would work).
157. In reMahurkar Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1370,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1813
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
158. Construction Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 713 F. Supp. 100, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). In Construction Technology, the defendant argued that UMCserved to eliminate the second
prong of the Timely Products test, thereby making evidence of ongoing difficulties and revisions
following the alleged on-sale event relevant only to the issue of experimental use. Id. at 104.
The court admonished that UMC "held simply that reduction to practice is not 'an absolute
requirement of the on-sale bar.'" (emphasis added). Id. Thus, according to the court, because the
absence of a reduction to practice does not prevent application of the bar, there is "nothing to
prevent its being considered along with other factors in determining whether the invention is
'operable and commercially marketable'" as stated in Timely Produci& Id.
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Circuit precedent, which states that reduction to practice does not
require commercial marketability or a commercial embodiment.'59
3. Joint development and sales to related entities
A sale or offer to sell does not trigger the on-sale bar unless it is
between "two separate entities. "1"u Separateness is determined in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the policies underlying
the bar.'61 A key question in making this assessment is whether the
seller entity exercises enough control over the purchaser entity's
business activities to prevent the invention from being commercially
exploited without the seller entity's consent. 2 If the seller entity
fails to exercise such control, a pre-critical date sale is inconsistent
with the third policy'"a underlying the on-sale bar. Thus, one
entity's ownership of stock in another entity, together with a certain
amount of control over the entity's operations, does not itself avoid
classification of two entities as separate for the purposes of § 102 (b). -
Similarly, the mere fact that a product is delivered to an intermedi-
ary or distributor does not avoid the bar where the entity and the
patentee are independently controlled."t Nor is there a per sejoint
development negation to the on-sale bar," although some
pre-Federal Circuit precedent indicated to the contrary. 7 Instead,
the issue turns on the totality of the circumstances, including whether
joint development was primarily for the purpose of experimentation
and in whose control development resided."t
159. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that reduction to practice does not require invention to be in commercially satisfactory stage of
development); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 838
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting notion that commercial marketability is required in addition to
reduction to practice to make invention complete).
160. See FeragAG, 45 F.3d at 1567 (finding that statutory bar raised under § 102(b) where
transaction between two separate entities is required); In reCaveney, 761 F.2d 671,676 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that sale or offer to sell between two entities is required under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b)); cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 482,521 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(finding that separate divisions of corporation are not separate entities).
161. See In re Cavney, 761 F.2d at 676 (deciding that two companies are separate entities
despite common ownership).
162. Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1567 ("Because Ferag could not control Ferag, Inc.'s, marketing of
the invention, the two companies were separate entities for section 102(b) purposes and the
transaction between them gives rise to a statutory bar.").
163. See infra Part VII.
164. FeragAG, 45 F.3d at 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
165. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676.
166. See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejectingjoint
development exception to on-sale bar).
167. See id& (discussing Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Mich.
1979), which assumed on-sale bar did not apply if invention was developed jointly).
168. See id. (finding that there was only one inventor of product and consequently rejecting
notion that both parties were part of "inventorship entity"); see also Schreiber Mfg. Co. v. Saft
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IV. THE PUBLIC-USE BAR
The Federal Circuit generally has adhered to the "extremely broad"
definition of public use adopted by other courts."6 9 In light of the
UMC Electronics decision, 'however, turmoil reigns among the district
courts as to the extent to which application of the public-use bar must
be predicated on some level of development of the invention. As with
the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit has made many a public-use
inquiry more indeterminate by articulating a totality of the circum-
stances test in conjunction with a policy based analysis. Finally, any
public-use bar inquiry is based on the same four fundamental ques-
tions that must be answered for the on-sale bar.170
A. Public-Use Activities
The Federal Circuit has embraced a number of longstanding
principles concerning what kind of activities constitute public use of
an invention. Like the on-sale bar, the public-use bar can derive from
the activities of either the inventor or a third party. 7' Normally,
public use includes use of the invention in public by the inventor for
a commercial purpose."7 A single pre-critical date use of the
invention can be a public use.7 Secrecy alone does not necessarily
negate public use. 4 Pre-critical date secret use of the invention by
Am., 704 F. Supp. 759, 763-65 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (deciding sale of product was for profit and
not for experimental purposes).
169. See Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (stating that term "public use"
has been given "extremely broad" construction).
170. See supra Part III (listing fundamental questions).
171. See In reEpstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that both "public-use" and
on-sale" bars may result from activities of third parties); Grain Processing Corp. v. American
Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that any use of invention by
person other than inventor, who is under no restriction or obligation of secrecy to inventor, is
public use); Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding journalist's demonstration of inventor's product constituted public use).
172. Compare Harrington Mfg., 815 F.2d at 1481 (determining that one inventor's
demonstration of prototype of his invention purely for purpose of commercial exploitation
constituted public use, even though his co-inventor was uncertain invention would work) with
In reYarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 277 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing use of
invention for experimental purposes only, even where profit is made).
173. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(acknowledging that public use can be confined to one person); cf Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S.
333, 336 (1881) (requiring only one public use, but noting that more uses strengthen proof);
Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 362 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1966) (stating that
only single use of invention for commercial purposes is required to show public use).
174. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding
commercial use to be public use even if it is kept secret). More recently, the Federal Circuit
stated that the public-use bar requires that (1) the invention was used in public, and (2) the use
was not primarily experimental in purpose. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995). While the Federal Circuit's reference to "in public"
1995] "ON-SALE" AND "PUBLIC-USE" BARS TO PATENTABILmIY 2377
the inventor primarily for commercial purposes thus constitutes public
use.175 On the other hand, truly private use by the inventor of her
own invention for enjoyment, rather than for commercial purposes,
is not public use.176
Furthermore, public use has long been defined as any use of the
invention by a person other than the inventor who is not under any
limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.
77
Consistent with its totality of circumstances and policy-based ap-
proach, however, the Federal Circuit has refined this general principle
as it relates to use authorized by the inventor. It has indicated that,
where commercialization is absent, the public-use bar may not apply
to an inventor who maintains control over the invention while
allowing a third party, such as a friend, to use the invention without
any express obligation of secrecy. 78 Nevertheless, even the public-
use bar may be activated where the third party, to whom the inventor
has disclosed the invention, then unwittingly permits another to have
free and unrestricted access to the invention. 79 According to a
suggests that a use of the invention must necessarily have occurred in public view, earlier
precedent refutes such an interpretation. See supra note 175; see also Electric Storage Battery Co.
v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 19-20 (1939) ("[T]he ordinary use of a machine or the practice of a
process in a factory in the usual course of producing articles for commercial purposes in public
use.").
175. Compare Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 390 ("A commercial use is a public use even if it is kept
secret.") with Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d
Cir. 1946) (finding personal use to be public use, even if kept secret, where used longer than
statutory period). In Kinzenbaw, there was a commercial use by the patentee because the
farmers who used the device were agents of the patentee. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 391.
Interestingly, the patentee conceded that it was not raising the experimental use negation. It
176. See Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1265-66 (stating that private use includes inventor showing
product to others as long as inventor retains control of product and its distribution);
Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 457 F. Supp. 213,224 (D. Minn. 1978) (allowing private use
for private purposes and enjoyment before patenting product), af/'d, 599 F.2d 62 (8th Cir.
1979); see also Beachcombers Int'l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that Moldcuon involved "an implied restriction of confidentiality").
177. See Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336 (declaring that allowing non-inventor to use product without
restriction or limitation constitutes public use); Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods.
Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting standard does not apply to experimental
purposes); In reSmith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying standard except in cases
where use was for experimental purposes); Randolph v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 533,
535 (7th Cir. 1959) (citations omitted) (stating that standard is applied except in cases of
experimental purposes performed in good faith); see also A/!id Colloids, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1843
(stating that mere fact that experiments were "commercially motivated" does not trigger bar,
because commercial purpose underlies virtually every contract).
178. See Moleulon, 793 F.2d at 1265-67 (noting Federal Circuit's approval of district court's
finding that inventor had not "given over" invention for "free and unrestricted use" by another
person); see also Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160 (noting that personal demonstration to friends at
party constituted public use); Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 390-91 (finding that testing of machine by
agents of patent owner served its commercial purposes and, therefore, absent any claim of
experimental use, constituted public use of invention).
179. SeeNational Research Dev. Corp. v.VarianAssocs., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537, 1538-39
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (finding that inventor must make sure that no one has
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non-precedential Federal Circuit decision, the reason is that the
public-use bar applies equally to the inventor's confidants and the
inventor." There is also an interplay between control and secrecy
such that the more sweeping and stringent the degree of confidential-
ity, the more likely it is, that the inventor maintained sufficient control
so as to avoid the bar. 8'
Moreover, it is well established that secret use of an invention by a
third party without the knowledge or consent of the inventor
constitutes a public use where the invention is discoverable or
ascertainable by examination of the product sold.' Except for this
limited situation, however, the vast majority of pre-Federal Circuit
precedent held that secret commercial use by such a third party did
not constitute public use.'" The Federal Circuit appeared to adopt
this majority rule in W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock.'" In a later
case, Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 8 however, another panel of the
Federal Circuit seemed to limit the holding in Gore as follows: "[In
Gore], this Court held that, in the particular circumstances there involved,
the secret use by third persons of a patented process to produce tape
that those persons sold commercially, did not constitute a public
use .... " 86 Given the absence of a detailed policy analysis in Gore
and the Federal Circuit's penchant for avoiding bright-line rules, this
issue may still have some life. 87
free access to invention).
180. UL
181. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160.
182. SeeJ.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding public use where invention was discoverable from device sold); see also In re Caveney,
761 F.2d 671, 675-76 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that claimed invention was disclosed to
purchaser).
183. Compare Puget Sound Salmon Egg Co. v. Shoshoni, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D.
Idaho 1970) (holding that use of product by others who are unable to determine how product
was made is not public use) and Chemithon Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 287 F. Supp. 291,
306, 313-14 (D. Md. 1968) (finding that product was publicly used when many employees of
another company used it and no effort was made to keep process secret) with Lorenz v.
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 167 F.2d 423, 429 (3d Cir. 1948) (stating that inventor must protect
product from public use before product is patented, because court will treat any disclosure as
public use, even if unintended).
184. 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The court found that secret commercial use by a third
party, where others could not determine the process, was not a public use. W.L. Gore &
Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.3d 1540, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
185. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
186. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
187. See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(supporting majority rule and stating that "[w] here a method is kept secret, and remains secret
after a sale of the product of the method, that sale will not, of course, bar another inventor
from the grant of a patent on that method"); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(supporting majority view and stating that pre-critical date sale of unpatented product will bar
patent of another unless patented method is secret and remains secret after sale of unpatented
products of method).
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B. The Invention
As with the on-sale bar, the prevailing view of pre-Federal Circuit
precedent was that actual reduction to practice was an essential
predicate to the application of the public-use bar.188 In practice,
some courts also followed the somewhat less vigorous "essentially
completed" criterion. 9 The Federal Circuit has not yet confronted
this issue explicitly. In fact, in UMC Electronics, the Federal Circuit
expressly limited its holding to the on-sale bar and acknowledged that
the public-use bar "implicates different considerations.""9  In this
regard, the Federal Circuit's pre-UMC Electronics decision in the case
of Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co.19" ' can
arguably be construed as supporting the prevailing view.19
The requirement of an actual reduction to practice has some facile
appeal because of the fundamental precept that an invention cannot
be in public use until it is at least embodied in a physical thing.
Arguably, such a requirement would also provide more predictability
to an assessment of the public-use bar. On the other hand, actual
reduction of practice in its legal sense involves more than just
188. See, eg., Dataq, Inc. v. Tokheim Corp., 736 F.2d 601, 605 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that
product does not exist before reduced to practice); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Pontiac, 717 F.2d
269, 273-74 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that unless product's operativeness is obvious by its
simplicity, product must be tested in work conditions before product is considered completed);
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 718 (1st Cir. 1981) (declaring that product is
not "on sale" unless it is operable and reduced to practice); Austin v. Marco Dental Prods.,
560 F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing inventor, who showed product at convention, to
avoid being barred from getting patent because product had not yet been reduced to practice);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 611 F. Supp. 1498, 1508-09 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that if
product has not been reduced to practice then there is nothing to disclose to public).
189. SeeRed Cross Mfg. Corp. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d 1135, 1141 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Exact
identity is not required as long as the invention is essentially completed at the time of the
invalidating sale." (quoting Dart Indus. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 489 F.2d 1359,
1365 (7th Cir. 1973))); see also UMO Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 655 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (noting that in cases like Dart, some courts would "attempt to shoehorn the reduction to
practice concept into the on-sale bar analysis ... [by assessing] whether the invention was
.sufficiently' reduced to practice for purposes of the bar"). In UMC Electronics, however, the
Federal Circuit stated that"adoption of a 'sufficiently' reduced-to-practice requirement is in fact
an abandonment of reduction to practice as that term is used in other contexts [such as
interferences]." I. Hence, the court declined to "adopt modifiers in connection with
'reduction to practice,' whatever the context." Id.
190. UMG, 816 F.2d at 652 n.5.
191. 815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
192. See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(noting that product does not have to work perfectly to be considered reduced to practice or
on sale or in public use); cf. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("A 'public use' for the purpose of barring access to the
patent system is a use more than a year before the patent filing date, whereby a compieted
invention is used in public, without restriction and in circumstances other than 'substantially for
the purpose of experiment.'" (quoting Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256
(1887) (emphasis added)).
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construction of a physical embodiment of the claimed invention. 193
Therefore, there conceivably can be use of an apparatus which
amounts to commercialization and which only later meets the legal
definition of an actual reduction to practice. Whether such use
should be deemed public use is open to legitimate disagreement.
Given the Federal Circuit's emphasis on a policy approach,1 94
however, the Federal Circuit may well extend its holding in UMC
Electronics to the public-use bar. Statements in early Supreme Court
cases, however, can be interpreted selectively as support for either side
of this issue. 95
Post-UMC Electronics district court decisions that have considered
this issue evince divergent views. Some courts continue to require an
actual reduction to practice.196 Other courts have adopted a
"sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended
purpose" requirement.'97
V. THE UNDERLYING POuCIES
Early in its history, the Federal Circuit eschewed any hard and fast
rules for analyzing the on-sale and public-use bars in favor of
evaluating the totality of the factual circumstances in light of the
193. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing inventor's subjective
appreciation and recognition as factors used to determine if invention was actually reduced to
practice).
194. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing policy issues that Federal
Circuit applies to analysis).
195. See, eg., Root v. Third Ave. R.R., 146 U.S. 210, 223-26 (1892) (explaining that product
may be used by some members of public for testing and still not be considered for public use);
Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887) (stating that if product is used
mainly for trade and experimental use is incidental, product will be considered for public use);
City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-35 (1877) (stating that,
where inventor tests product to his and others' benefits, product will not be considered for
public use if inventor is using it for experimental purposes); see also Lyman v. Maypole, 19 F.
735, 736-37 (N.D. Ill. 1884) (noting that if inventor sells product that is used for business and
not for experimental purposes, product is deemed to be of public use even if inventor continues
testing product).
196. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 611 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding
that public-use bar requires actual reduction to practice), afftd, 789 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied; 479 U.S. 931 (1986). The court stated that"[w]hen a party asserts that a prior use antici-
pates a patent claim under Section 102(a) or (b), that party must also establish that such a use
was of a complete invention, i.e., conceived and reduced to practice, and public." Id.; see also
Klein v. Cannondale Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1506 (D. Conn. 1988) (requiring actual
reduction to practice for public-use bar).
197. Southwest Aerospace Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 702 F. Supp. 870, 884, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) 1949, 1960 (N.D.AIa. 1988) (holding no public-use barwhen product was not sufficiently
tested for intended use). The court found that, in light of the evidence that the claimed
invention was not in commercial form at the time and that the invention was not known to be
useful to perform its intended function, the invention was not "sufficiently tested to demonstrate
that it would work for its intended purpose" until after critical date and there was no public use
or sale of invention under section 102(b). Id.
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policies underlying these bars.198 According to the Federal Circuit,
these policies include:
(1) discouraging removal of inventions from the public domain that
the public recently has become to believe are freely available [(i.e.,
avoidance of detrimental public reliance)]; (2) favoring the prompt
and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public; (3) allowing
the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to
determine the potential economic value of a patent [(i.e., one
year)]; and (4) prohibiting the inventor from commercially
exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily prescribed period
(i.e., preventing pre-application commercial exploitation of the
invention beyond the bar period)."
The fourth policy is the most important one and must be weighed
with the "sometimes inconsistent" other three policies.2' A
paradigmatic example of the application of these policy consider-
ations in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances test is the
case of Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems.2°'
These policy considerations antedate the Federal Circuit by several
decades. Early Supreme Court cases explicated one or more of
them. °2 The famous case of Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing and Auto Parts Co.2 3 delved into the second and fourth of
these policy considerations in detail. °4 In 1981, these policy
198. See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, 731 F.2d 831,836 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (applying test consistent with underlying policies of on-sale bar); TP Lab., Inc. v.
Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (balancing factors including
disclosure to public and need to perfect invention).
199. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
200. Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
201. 917 F.2d 544, 549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying factors and showing that inventor
actions were consistent with policies by applying for patent after necessary tests were conducted).
202. SeeEgbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333,337-38 (1881) (illustrating that ifinventor allows
product to be used without restrictions for longer than statutorily prescribed period, then
product will be deemed abandoned and patent will be void); Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v.
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 95-97 (1877) (applying abandonment policy and stating that if inventor fails
to apply for patent when appropriate, then inventor loses right); City of Elizabeth v. American
Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (allowing good faith experimental use of
product to avoid public use); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 323 (1833) (stating that if
invention goes into public use by any means, inventor must immediately assert patent right or
else lose right); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (holding that if inventor puts
product into public use or sells it before applying for patent then inventor is barred from calm
on patent).
203. 153 F.2d 516, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1946). For an interesting discussion of the interrelation-
ship between market analysis and the policies, see In reMahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis
Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1367-72 (N.D. I11. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.).
204. SeeMetallizing Eng'gCo. v. Kenyon Bearing &Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516,519-20 (2d
Cir. 1946) (prohibiting inventor from deriving benefit from sale or use of product based on
policies that inventor should not be able to extend monopoly beyond patent period and that
public has right to prompt and widespread disclosure).
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considerations were distilled in the Court of Claims case of General
Electric Co. v. United States.205 What has changed under the Federal
Circuit, however, is that the court has mandated that these policy
considerations be intertwined with a totality of the circumstances
test.2°  Therefore, it is often more difficult to predict the outcome
of any on-sale or public-use bar issue with any reasonable certainty.
VI. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The requirement of looking to the totality of the circumstances to
resolve an on-sale or public-use bar inquiry did not originate with the
Federal Circuit. As discussed previously, some courts adopted such an
approach in lieu of formulating rigid or bright-line rules.20 7  With
regard to experimental-use negation, the Ninth Circuit similarly
avoided bright-line rules in Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto Chemical
Coatings ° which held that the applicability of the negation depend-
ed "entirely on a determination, from the totality of evidence
presented by both parties, of the nature of the acts committed prior
to the critical date and the purpose that motivated the commission of
those acts."2°
Shortly after its inception, the Federal Circuit adopted a totality of
the circumstances test for determining the existence of a public-use
or on-sale bar and for assessing the availability of the experimental-use
negation.2 10  In addition, the court stressed that the test was to be
applied in light of the policies underlying the bars.2 ' In this
205. 654 F.2d 55, 61-63 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (illustrating application of four policies).
206. See infra Part VI (discussing application of totality of circumstances test).
207. See, e.g., Red Cross Mfg. Corp. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d 1135, 1139-41 (7th Cir. 1975)
(analyzing facts based on their effects, and not on formal requisites of challenged activity);
Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961) (rejecting "hard and fast
rules of law based upon overly refined legal distinctions" in light of infinite factual situations and
policies governing them); see also Powell Mfg. Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 319 F. Supp. 24, 41
(E.D.N.C. 1970) (stating that issue of public use is "a question of fact in light of all the
evidence").
208. 356 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1966).
209. Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 356 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1966).
210. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that on-sale bar is determined by considering "the surrounding circumstances");
TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (positing that
public use is determined upon consideration of "the entire surrounding circumstances"); In re
Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "totality of the evidence" determines
experimental use). Still later the court explicitly denominated the test as the "totality of
circumstances." Western Marine Elecs. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
211. Western Marine 764 F.2d at 845 (stating that in order to agree with underlying policies,
court "will want to consider the totality of circumstances... along with the character and extent
of bona fide experimentation"); see also UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[aIll of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell,
including the stage of development of the invention and the nature of the invention, must be
considered and weighed against the policies underlying section 102(b)").
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regard, the Federal Circuit has set forth a list of non-exclusive factors
which are to be considered, where appropriate, in assessing whether
under the totality of the circumstances the on-sale or public-use bars
exist. A number of these factors overlap with the factors that are
pertinent to a determination of whether the experimental-use
negation is applicable.212
Factors relevant to the on-sale bar when there is an issue concern-
ing the relationship between the patentee and a customer include:
(1) the need for testing by someone other than the patentee; (2) the
stage of development of the invention, including the existence of
prototypes; (3) the amount of control exercised by the inventor or
patentee; (4) whether payments were made and the basis for the
payments; (5) whether confidentiality was required; (6) whether
technological changes were made; (7) the character and extent of
promotional activities; and (8) lack of record keeping by the inven-
tor.
213
Factors bearing on an evaluation of public-use bar include many of
the same factors used for assessing both the on-sale bar and experi-
mental-use negation.214 As with the Federal Circuit's on-sale bar
precedent, the focus is on objective evidence, and the subjective belief
of inventors or customers must be weighed against the opposing
objective evidence. 21 '  Nevertheless, in either case the inventor or
patentee's control over the invention is an important factor.18
212. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (identifying policies underlying on-sale
and public-use bars); infra note 259 and accompanying text (identifying factors to be considered
in assessing experimental use regulation).
213. Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
United States Envtl. Prods. Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Baker Oil
Tools v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563-65 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Western Marine, 764 F.2d at
845.
214. See US. Environmental, 911 F.2d at 716-17 (using same list of factors to determine
existence of either on-sale or public-use bar); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing various determinative factors). Additional factors include: (1) the
nature of he activity that occurred in public; (2) the public's access to and knowledge of the
public use; (3) the length of the test period in comparison with similar tests; and (4) the
number of tests and their scale compared with commercial conditions. Allied Colloids, Inc. v.
American Cynamid Co., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
215. See U.S. Environmental, 911 F.2d at 717 ("The subjective belief of inventors or customers
... must be weighed against objective evidence which indicates otherwise."); TP Lab., Inc. v.
Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that "inventor's
expression of his subjective intent... is generally of minimal value").
216. See U.S. Environmenta 911 F.2d at 717-18 (indicating that lack of inventor's control over
invention, although not determinative, was important factor to be considered in assessing on-sale
bar); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, 793 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (refusing to
find public-use bar where inventor allowed some close friends to use the invention while
maintaining control over limited third-party use primarily for private enjoyment).
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VII. EXPERIMENTAL USE
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Law
Experimental use is a judicially created doctrine rooted in the
seminal Supreme Court case of City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson
Pavement Co.,2" 7 where the Court made two critical observations.
First, the Court stated that "[t]he use of an invention by the inventor
himself, or by any other person under his direction, by way of
experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has
never been regarded as [public] use."" 8 Second, the Court noted:
It is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advan-
tage over the public by delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as
he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself for a longer period
than is allowed by the policy of the law; but this cannot be said with
justice when the delay [in filing] is occasioned by a bonafide effort
to bring his invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will
answer the purpose intended .... 219
Ever since the City of Elizabeth decision, courts have wrestled with
two fundamental questions: (1) to what extent must the purpose of
the asserted public-use or on-sale activity be bona fide experimenta-
tion; and (2) what constitutes the period of experimentation with the
invention for the purpose of the experimental-use doctrine. Some
circuits have held that the doctrine applies only where the activity was
solely or purely experimental. 2" The Second Circuit, however, held
that only the primary purpose of the activity need be experimen-
t. 2 1 In Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co.,222 the Ninth
Circuit adopted a variation of this primary purpose test ruling that a
sale or offer for sale barred any inquiry into the experimental nature
of the sale, unless the sales contract or offer to sell contained an
217. 97 U.S. 126 (1878).
218. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) (citing
Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833)).
219. Id. at 137.
220. See, e.g., Dart Indus. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir.
1973) (stating that public-use bar may be avoided by proof that use was purely experimental);
Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407,414 (6th Cir. 1973) (denying claim because uses
of brake devices were not "secret orpurely experimental"); National Biscuit Co. v. Crown Baking
Co., 105 F.2d 422,426 (1st Cir. 1939) (holding that uses of products or devices must be "merely
to test out... invention").
221. Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1975).
222. 482 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1973).
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express or implied condition that the sale was made primarily for
experimentation.2
The Fifth Circuit heavily criticized the Ninth-Circuit's so-called
"Robbins rule"224 and expounded its own variation, holding that the
doctrine could be invoked where experimental purpose "predomi-
nates."2' This variation recognized that the experimental use doc-
trine was "basically a question of the inventor's intent."226  It,
therefore, required a weighing of two motives, experimentation and
commercialization, to determine which motive predominated.227 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit stated that the inventor's intent ordinarily
should be entitled to very little weight 228 Finally, many decisions,
including C.C.P.A. precedent, characterized the experimental-use
doctrine as an "exception" to an on-sale or public-use bar.229
Perhaps initially owing to the uncertainty engendered by the
Supreme Court's language in City of Elizabeth,2s courts developed
differing views as to whether it was necessary that the experimentation
be for the primary purpose of actually reducing the invention to
practice, or whether the period of experimentation could encompass
post-reduction-to-practice experimentation. The prevailing view was
that the experimental-use period may well extend beyond the point
of actual reduction to practice." Nevertheless, by focusing on
whether the activity was for the purpose of perfecting an incomplete
invention, some decisions held that actual reduction to practice ended
the period of experimentation which would otherwise negate the
223. Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 434 (9th Cir. 1973).
224. See In reYam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis added)) (stating that there cannot be "any use or sale of invention at all").
225. l at 288.
226. IL
227. I4
228. See Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426,481 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that
inventor's intent is "insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to defeat an adverse
summary judgment").
229. See, eg., In reTheis, 610 F.2d 786, 792-93 (C.C.PA. 1979) (finding customer's six-month
evaluation of product outside scope of "experimental use exception"); In reYarn Processing,
498 F.2d at 288 n.7 (noting that if inventor's main purpose is experimentation, "experimental
use exception applies"); Robbins, 482 F.2d at 432 (indicating types of sales nonpreclusive of
.experimental exception").
280. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (discussing experimental use doctrine).
231. For opinions adhering to this view, see Del Mar Eng'g Lab. v. Physio-Tronics, 642 F.2d
1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1981); Atlas v. Eastern Airlines, 311 F.2d 156,162 (lst Cir. 1962); Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Schriber-Schroth Co., 92 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 305
U.S. 47 (1938); General Motors Corp. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 123 F. Supp. 506,519-21 (N.D.
Ind. 1954); see. also CHISUM, supra note 18, § 6.02[7], at 6-85 to -86 (describing view that
experimental-use period may well extend beyond point of actual reduction to practice).
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public-use or on-sale bars.32 Indeed, at least one decision of the
C.C.P.A. intimated that experimental use could extend beyond the
reduction to practice of the claimed invention,33 while a Court of
Claims case intimated the opposite .2 ' Notwithstanding this uncer-
tainty, there was virtual unanimity that the experimental-use "excep-
tion" was not applicable to experiments performed with respect to
unclaimed features of an invention.3 5
B. Federal Circuit Law
In one of its earliest cases addressing this issue,21 the Federal
Circuit characterized experimental use as a "negation," rather than an
"exception," to the on-sale and public-use bars, thereby adding to the
lexicon of patent terminology.27 It did so despite having lapsed
into calling experimental use an "exception" in an earlier case.2
In addition, the Federal Circuit adopted the primary purpose test,
which states that a pre-critical date public-use or on-sale activity is
negated if the primary purpose of the activity was experimenta-
tion.2 9  The Federal Circuit also adopted the requirement of a
nexus between the experimentation and the claimed features of the
invention.
240
232. See In re Yarn Processing, 498 F.2d at 279-85 (holding that experiments must be
reasonably necessary" in order to avoid public-use bar); Nicholson v. Carl W. Mullis Eng'g &
Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1963) (stating that invention that meets legal definition
of reduction to practice is no longer in experimental stage).
233. In reJosserand, 188 F.2d 486,490-94 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (noting that reduction to practice
does not necessarily imply public use).
234. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (adopting idea that
reduction to practice by definition post-dates testing sufficient to ensure functionability).
235. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kent Indus., 409 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1969)
(concluding that experimentation unclaimed cement ingredient is irrelevant to question of
experimental use of cement); Robine v. Apco, Inc., 386 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1967)
(disqualifying from experimental use exception experimentation related to device used in
combination with other items, but not device itself); Midland Flour Milling Co. v. Bobbitt, 70
F.2d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 1934) (noting that imperfect interactions between perfected invention
and other devices does not negate existence of invention in finished form).
236. TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
237. It. at 971. The Federal Circuit characterized this difference as "not merely semantic."
Id. Under a fair reading of City of Elizabeth, this characterization appears to be correct. Seesupra
notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing experimental use language from City of
Elizabeth); see alsoAtlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding on-sale bar invalidates patent for invention offered for sale); ef. Sinskey v. Pharmacia
Opthalmics, 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing shifting burdens of proof where
experimental use asserted to overcome claim of anticipation).
238. See InreSmith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In reMann, 861 F.2d 1581,
1582 (Fed Cir. 1988) (continuing lapse of calling experimental use exception rather than
negation).
239. Baker Oil Tools v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1558-63 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
240. Atlantic Themwplastics Co., 970 F.2d at 836 (requiring proof that complete claimed
invention "is embodied in or obvious in view of the thingsold or offered for sale" for invocation
of on-sale bar); c. Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 498 (stating that to avoid on-sale bar, activity must be
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The Federal Circuit, however, did not address explicitly the
question of whether experimentation could extend beyond reduction
to practice until RCA Corp. v. Data General Cop. 241 In RCA, the
Federal Circuit held that "experimental use, which means perfecting
or completing an invention to the point of determining that it will
work for its intended purpose, ends with an actual reduction to prac-
tice."242 Interestingly, some of the Federal Circuit's earlier decisions
at least implied that the court would adopt the prevailing view.
243
On its face, the RCA holding is limited to the on-sale bar.244
Accordingly, one post-RCA district court decision has declined to
extend the RCA holding to the public-use bar.21 Another has,
however, at least impliedly made such an extension.2' The Federal
Circuit's decision in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,247
however, with its emphasis on application of the underlying policies
in conjunction with an experimental use analysis, suggests that the
Federal Circuit may so extend its RCA ruling.2' Whether the RCA
holding comports with the above-quoted language from City of
Elizabeth is debatable.
shown to be "'substantially for purposes of experiment'" (quoting Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at
1564); In reBrigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (discussing but not concluding on
issue of whether activities that are "solely for experimental purposes" will negate on-sale bar);
In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1136 (asserting experimental use exception inapplicable to "experiments
performed with respect to unclaimed features of an invention").
241. 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Court's statement in UMC Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987), that reduction to practice might well be
dispositive of whether a sale met the experimental-use negation, perhaps foreshadowed its
holding.
242. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
243. SeePennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Court
stated that "[i]f any commercial exploitation does occur, it must be merely incidental to the
primary purpose of experimentation to perfect the invention." I&; see also TP Lab., Inc. v.
Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that court must decide
whether "entirety of the evidence led to the conclusion that there had been a 'public use'"); In
re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1134 ("The experiment to improve and perfect the invention must be the
real purpose in such public use and not merely incidental and subsidiary.").
244. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Fayley Corp., 5 F.3d 1437, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing to RCA only to extent that it addresses on-sale bar).
245. See Keams v. Wood Motors, 773 F. Supp. 979, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (noting that on-
sale and public-use bars, while "undeniably related" grounds for invalidating patent, "are not
interchangeable").
246. Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (extending, by
implication, RCA logic on effect of actual reduction to practice to public-use bar); see also
Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1252, 1285 (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (discussing effect
of reduction to practice in experimental use exception); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp., 762 F. Supp. 480, 506 (D. Conn. 1991) (indicating that experimental use concludes after
tests show product functions as intended or anticipated environment).
247. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
248. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(concluding that public test of device not filly tested in its intended environment does not
imply device is in public domain).
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The Federal Circuit has also augmented the importance of the
"inventor's control over the experimentation" where the patentee's
argument is based on an assertion of the experimental-use nega-
tion.249 At least one Federal Circuit case suggests that the inventor's
control over the testing of the invention is a sine qua non for invoking
the experimental-use negation.2 5 ° Consequently, at least one district
court has elevated the importance of this factor.25'
In assessing whether the experimental-use negation applies, the
Federal Circuit looks to the totality of the circumstances and
concentrates on objective evidence. 2 Therefore, a bare finding
that the patentee was engaged in prototype testing and development
is not enough to negate the bar. 55 Moreover, the subjective intent
of the inventor is viewed with the same degree of skepticism for the
experimental-use negation as for the on-sale and public-use bars.
254
An inventor's subjective intent to experiment, therefore, is of minimal
value unless it is supported by sufficient objective evidence.255 This
approach comports with pre-Federal Circuit precedent, which assigns
little weight to bare allegations of subjective intent.2 By the same
249. See In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1581-83 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that because both
inventor and assignee failed to maintain control over testing tended to show that their
motivation was not experimental); Paragon Podiatry Lab. v. KLM Lab., 984 F.2d 1182, 1185-87
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing inventor's control of devices as "wholly lacking").
250. In reHamilton, 882 F.2d at 1580; see Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1185-87 (using inventor's lack
of control as major factor in finding against inventor). After citing Hamilton for this proposition,
however, Paragon ultimately seemed to apply the totality of circumstances approach. Id at 1192-
93; see also United States Envtl. Prods. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717-18 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(indicating that "control," while not determinative, is "important factor" in public-use inquiry.)
251. Gennodie v. Metro North Commuter RR. Co., 1995 WL 366442 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The
threshold issue in determining whether the use of a product is experimental is a finding that
the inventor had control over the invention during the course of the testing.").
252. SeeAtlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(stating that in context of experimental-use negation to on-sale bar, "a court must examine the
claimed features, the offeror's objective intent, and the totality of the circumstances"); LaBounty
Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
"[a]n inventor's protestation of an intent to experiment... is of little evidentiary value"); Baker
Oil Tools v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that in determining
whether experimental-use negation applies, "[tihe underlying facts of each case must be
considered in light of all of the circumstances."); In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (holding that objective evidence is to be used to determine applicability of experimental-
use negation).
253. Atlantic Thermzoplastics, 5 F.3d at 1480.
254. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1072 (holding that "[a]n inventor's protestation of an intent to
experiment... is of little evidentiary value").
255. kL; see also Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1186-87 (holding that inventor's subjective belief that
sales were experimental does not raise genuine issue of material fact); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d
1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that inventor's belief of lack of commercial viability is not
dispositive); TRW Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 835 F. Supp. 994, 1003, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065,
1084-86 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (asserting that inventor's subjective intent is of "minimal value").
256. SeeRobbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426,431 (9th Cir. 1973) ("An inventor's
testimony of his subjective intent has no probative value against overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.").
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token, objective evidence that a sale was made because the purchaser
was participating in experimental testing creates no on-sale bar. 7
Any assertion of experimental sales, however, requires at a minimum
that the customer be made aware of the experimentation."8
The Federal Circuit has articulated a helpful list of non-exhaustive
factors which, where appropriate, should be considered in an
experimental-use analysis. The factors include: (1) the length of the
test period; (2) the necessity for public testing; (3) whether any
payment was made for the inventions; (4) whether there was any
secrecy obligations on the part of the user; (5) whether progress
records were kept and required; (6) whether persons, other than the
inventor, conducted the experiments; (7) the amount of control
retained by the inventor over the experiments; (8) how long the test
period was in relation to the test periods of similar devices; (9) the
existence of promotional activities; (10) the degree of commercial
exploitation during the test in relation to the purpose of the experi-
mentation; and (11) the extent to which it is customary practice in
the relevant industry to submit samples of proposed devices to
potential customers for testing or determination of utility.
259
A number of these factors also come into play in any on-sale or
public-use bar inquiry. In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
2 °
the Federal Circuit counseled that these factors were subordinate to
the policy considerations underlying the statute.261
Finally, in In re Mann,262 the Federal Circuit seemingly held that
the experimental-use negation does not apply to design patents,
because "[o]btaining the reactions of people to a design... is not
experimentation" in the sense envisioned by the negation.2
257. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that sale
made to further purchaser's experimental use does not create on-sale bar); Great Northern
Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 165 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting notion that sale
to customer for experimental use created on-sale bar); cf Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co.,
948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("ETihe on sale bar... does not arise simply because the
intended customer was participating in development and testing.").
258. Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1186; LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1072; see In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393,
1401 (E.C.PA 1975) (stating that inventor's "failure to communicate to any of the purchasers
or prospective purchasers of the device that the sale or offering was for experimental use is fatal
to his case").
259. United States Envtl. Prods. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Grain
Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil
Tools v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In reBrigance, 792 F.2d at 1108;
see also Joy Technologies, Inc., v. Flakt, 820 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Del. 1993) (listing similar
factors that warrant consideration). The fifth and seventh factors are "highly relevant." Allied
Colloids, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
260. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
261. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
262. 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
263. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Nevertheless, a subsequent district court opinion held that In re Mann
was limited to its facts and thus did not completely foreclose
application of the negation to design patents, at least not where the
use in public was for the purpose of enabling the inventor to evaluate
the design, rather than to see if customers liked it.218 More recent-
ly, in Tone Brothers v. Sysco Corp.,26 the Federal Circuit characterized
its "broad statement" in In re Mann as "arguably dictum" and went on
to hold that experimentation directed to functional features of a
product also containing an ornamental design could negate what
otherwise would be considered a public use within the meaning of
§ 102(b).6 The Court further distinguished In re Mann on the
ground that it involved activity directed toward generating consumer
interest in the aesthetics of the design as opposed to evaluating the
effect of functional features of the design on the overall function of
the product. 267 It thus was at odds with the third policy underlying
the bars. In this regard, the Federal Circuit noted that the following
factors should be considered in connection with the experimental-use
inquiry for design patents: (1) the length of the test period and
number of tests as compared with a similar type of test on a similar
type of design; (2) whether a user made any payment for the device;
(3) whether a user agreed to use secretly; (4) whether records were
kept of the progress of the test; and (5) whether persons other than
the designer conducted the asserted experiments."
CONCLUSION
After more than a decade of Federal Circuitjurisprudence, the on-
sale and public-use bars still remain a rather volatile and unpredict-
able area of patent law. In particular, although the Federal Circuit
has diminished confusion apparent in pre-Federal Circuit precedent
concerning the standards to be applied in assessing the existence of
an on-sale or public-use bar, these standards are inherently uncertain.
With respect to many aspects of the bars, reference must be made to
the totality of the circumstances in light of the policies underlying the
bar. As a result, patent practitioners must take a fresh approach to
each factual situation, without the benefit of bright-line rules to guide
264. IKO Chicago v. Certainteed Corp., No. 92-C-1929, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17603, at *7
(N.D. Il. Dec. 16, 1993).
265. 28 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.LW. 3685-86 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1995).
266. Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.LW.
3685-86 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1995).
267. hi at 1200.
268. 1I (citing TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,971-72 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
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them. Given the substantial investment and value inherent in
technologies protected by the patent grant, it is eminently arguable
that a desirable goal of the Federal Circuit would be to make this
important area of the law more predictable. Given the controlling
standards, however, predictability appears to be an elusive goal.
Moreover, quite apart from the inherent uncertainty engendered by
the standards, there are still a number of important, undecided
questions involving these standards. For example, the Court has yet
,to decide definitively whether the apparent holding in RCA, that for
the purpose of the on-sale bar experimental use ends with reduction
to practice, applies to the public-use bar as well. Further, although
eight years have passed since the Federal Circuit's decision in UMC,
the Federal Circuit has yet to provide further guidance on the
particular stage, if any, of development the claimed invention must
have attained as a predicate to triggering the on-sale bar. Patent
practitioners, therefore, need to be fully conversant with the ever-
evolving body of Federal Circuitjurisprudence concerning the on-sale
and public-use bars and be able to adopt a flexible and imaginative
approach to issues in this area.

